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On 28 September 2015 the Taliban launched a major offensive in North Afghanistan resulting 
in the overrun of city of Kunduz. The fact that some hundred Taliban fighters were taking 
over a major urban centre- an area which was held by 7000 regular Afghan troops, in less than 
24 hours, is not only a military debacle for the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) 
but also an embarrassment for the provincial authorities. For it represents the greatest success 
of the Taliban in an open battlefield marked by an extraordinary ‘propaganda coup’. The fact 
that the temporary fallout of Kunduz coincided with the first anniversary of the Presidency 
Mohammad Ashraf Ghani and its joint government with Chief Executive Officer Abdullah 
Abdullah underpins the political paramountcy and dramatic exposure of the security 
dimension of Afghanistan. Subsequently, the Afghan Army with support of the special NATO 
forces comprising US, British and German troops readily took to regain control over 
Afghanistan’s sixth biggest city consisting of 300,000 inhabitants. 
 
In this state of quandary, it is important to note that being one of the provincial capitals in the 
country’s north, Kunduz is of tremendous geostrategic importance. The city is linked by 
highways to Kabul in the south, with Mazar-e-Sharif in the west and Tajikistan in the north- it 
serves as Afghanistan’s most significant gateway to Central Asia. Having Kunduz in check 
means controlling not only formal trade but also the most lucrative informal one, especially 
the smuggling of drugs. Thereby, although the Taliban failed to hold onto Kunduz for long, 
but the ongoing battle for Kunduz has serious implications and is highly symbolic nature for 
several reasons.  
 
First, a sustainable victory in Kunduz would clearly point at the total military defeat and the 
fruitlessness of development/reconstruction engagement of NATO/ISAF mission with its 
civilian components. Secondly, the establishment of Taliban administration in Kunduz (and/or 
in large parts of the urban hinterland) would signify that the Taliban are not only back in 
power outside Kabul but that all (smaller and bigger) achievements of the international 
community in Afghanistan regarding social, economic and political conditions of the 
Afghans, especially for women and girls, would come to an end. In other words, the changing 
facts on the ground and the desired overthrow of the ‘current westernised, post-Taliban 
constitution’ will justify as the final symbolic act that brings an end to the longstanding US 
and European influence in the country’s politics.  
 
Thirdly, the recapture of the first major city in Afghanistan exemplifies the rise of the Taliban 
in northern Afghanistan and exemplifies the expansion of Taliban’s movement beyond its 
ethnic Pashtun base in southern Afghanistan and north-western Pakistan. In this context, it is 
also interesting to note that the Taliban were able to gain control in areas (like the ethnic-
Tajik dominated Badakhshan province) which were not only free of Taliban but also 
strongholds of their major, remaining enemy during the regime from 1996-2001, Afghanistan, 
the so called Northern Alliance. Given this, Kunduz also represents that there is no change in 
Pakistan’s Afghanistan approach. The army’s top brass and ISI seems to be stuck in 
traditional patterns of foreign policy, which is greatly dominated by a deep entrenched 
animosity towards India paralleled with a willingness to gain strategic depth in Afghanistan. 
In this context, it is obvious that they still believe to use the Taliban and other terrorists 
groups as instruments to secure their interests. For the launch of the military Operation Zarb-
e-Azb against terrorist elements on Pakistani soil in summer 2014 and the approval of 
National Action Plan (NAP) in December 2014 do not mark at any paradigm shift in the 
‘working relationship’ between Pakistani state agents and terrorist groups. These anti-terrorist 
measures are rather aiming to contain the terrorist threat within own borders by pushing the 
Jihadists into Afghanistan. The  reasoning to this is two-fold: first,  Pakistan attempts not only 
to whitewash its own role in the ongoing developments in international terrorism but also to 
jerk its closest partner China around. Latter phenomenon has a special connotation since 
Beijing is planning major investments in Pakistan in the context of the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC) and consequent Pakistani efforts to ensure stability in 
Afghanistan is a major Chinese condition/requirement. And second, it seems that the ‘old 
guards’ of Pakistan security establishment, representing the mind-set of hardliners like former 
Director General of ISI Hamid Gul, still believe that they are able to contain the Taliban 
within the Afghan borders and use them as an instrument. By doing so, they continue to 
underestimate the increasing significance of international Jihadist networks and their 
autonomous dynamics which are no more controlled by the ISI. 
 
 Fourthly, a sustainable victory is not just a PR-coup for the Taliban. For it is aimed at 
sending a clear message to the international community in general and to the Pakistan and 
Afghanis tan government in particular, that the Afghan Taliban movement stands united and 
that attempts to split them is a failure. In this context, a re-capture of Kunduz significantly 
strengthened the position of the new leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour and will 
keep his opposition and the threat of factionalism at bay. Furthermore, the conquest of the city 
demonstrates the resurgence of the Taliban and its allies. It is a signal that the Jihadists are no 
longer just lurking in the background, but have the capacity to challenge the state apparatus- 
the crucial Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). 
 
 Fifthly, the ‘PR-coup of the Kunduz victory’ will not only help to improve the ability to 
recruit new fighters in order to avoid defections to other (obvious more successful) militant 
groups but also help improve the position, status, and control of Taliban vis-a-vis the Islamic 
State, which has been challenging the Taliban's supremacy in Afghanistan. In addition, 
Kunduz is of symbolic significance for the Taliban because it was a key northern stronghold 
before the collapse of the Taliban rule in 2001 Sixthly, the release of two former Afghan 
Taliban cabinet ministers Mullah Abdul Salam Akhund and Mullah Mohammed Hassan from 
Pakistani custody and that their capability to move to north Afghanistan and organising the 
temporary overrun of Kunduz does not come with a surprise. For there is no change in the 
traditional pattern of operation between Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy and the subsequent 
instrumental role of the Taliban. 
 
 And finally, at the very core of the symbolism of Kunduz lies the semblance of a tectonic 
shift in the Taliban’s self-conception and especially self-portrayal- representing an inclusive 
movement. However, one should shed light on the composition of the ‘Taliban forces’ 
involved in the takeover of Kunduz and also about the other groups which were joining the 
fighting of the Islamists insurgents. Against this backdrop, it seems that the Taliban is trying 
to learn a lesson from the past and attempt to broaden their social structure and base by 
softening their stand toward Afghanistan’s’ non-Pashtun population and non-Afghan 
migrants. Thereby, the ‘battle over Kunduz’ symbolizes a change in overall political strategy 
and subsequently the recruitment patterns of the Taliban: from a mainly Pashtun-focused 
composition of its ranks and files towards a more ‘multi-ethnic force’ in order to improve 
their chances of maintaining rule over captures of territory, especially in the north of 
Afghanistan, a historical stronghold of anti-Taliban forces. 
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